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Efficiency wage models have been criticized because worker malfeasance
can be prevented in a pareto efficient manner by requiring workers to post a bond
which they lose if they are caught cheating.However, since it is costly to
monitor workers and costless to demand a larger bond, firms should pay nothing
for monitoring and demand very large bonds. Since we observe that firms devote
considerable resources to monitoring workers, bonds must be limited. Therefore
firms must use second best alternatives --intensivemonitoring and/or efficiency
wages. The payment of efficiency wages cannot be ruled out on a priori theore-
tical grounds.
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Efficiencywage models, in which workers are paid a wage above the reservation
wage in order to give them an incentive not to quit, steal or shirk, provide an
attractive explanation for a wide variety of phenomena including involuntary un-
employment, the large differences between industries in the wages paid for what
appear to be similar workers, and the existence of the dual labormarket.The
primary criticism of efficiency wage models is that similar incentives can be
provided in a pareto efficient manner by having workers post bonds against
malfeasance. Equivalently, firms can pay efficiency wages but charge workers an
employment fee which makes them indifferent between taking a particular job or
seeking alternative employment. The bond or employment fee can either be paid
at the beginning of employment, or over time if workers receive lower wages in
the initial months or years of employment. Bonds can be paid back as a lump-sum
upon retirement, as an annuity or pension after retirement and/or as higher wages
paid most commonly towards the end of one's career. Lazear (1979,1981) has pro-
posed this as an explanation for tenure-earnings profiles and a number of other
phenomena.
In this note we argue that the first best efficient bonding solution is ev-
idently unattainable in practice. With efficient bonding firms should be spending
nothing or only an infinitesimal amount on monitoring workers to detect
malfeasance. Since firms are observed to devote substantial resources to moni-
toring workers, bonding must be incomplete. We argue that firms must be choosing
one or both of two inefficient solutions -- monitoringworkers intensively and/or
paying efficiency wages.' Evidently there are limits on the size of the bond a
firm may demand. These could be due to either the possibility of the firm de-
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workers.
The next section contains a more detailed discussion of this basicpoint.
Section II presents a formal model of bonding and efficiencywages with variable
monitoring costs. The formal model allows us to identify the conditions under
which firms will choose intensive monitoring rather than efficiencywages.
I.EFFICIENCY WAGES VS. BONDING
Sincein a perfectly competitive labor market there is no unemployment and
all equivalent workers receive the same wage, separations are costless to workers.
As a consequence firms cannot punish worker malfeasance byfiring them, and
therefore workers can be expected to shirk or steal unless firms candevelop other
means of punishing malfeasance.Several authors (Calvo, 1979; Stoft, 1982;
Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984; Bowles, 1985; Jones, 1985; Bulow and Summers, 1985)
have developed models in which firms pay workers more than their reservationwages
so that it is costly to workers to be fired (or equivalently, in models in which
workers quit too frequently, it is costly to them to quit).
A common objection to these models is that employers can solve theseproblems
in a pareto-efficient manner by requiring employees to post a bondagainst
shirking or quitting.Instances of direct bonding are very rare although not
unknown. However, overt bonding is formally equivalent to the sort ofemployment
relation described by Lazear (1979, 1981).In his model, workers post a bond
against cheating by accepting wages below their marginal product initially and
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later in life and/or in the form of a pension upon retirement. Many find this
argument -- thatefficiency wages are inefficient and therefore unlikely to be
used --compelling.2Discussion at several conferences and seminars we have at-
tended indicates to us that acceptance of the efficiency wage model has been in-
3
hibited by this argument.
A common response to this objection is to argue that there are limits on the
size of the bonds firms can demand. An alternative to paying efficiency wages
when bonding is limited is increased monitoring of workers. Some monitoring is
required with either bonding or efficiency wages since it is useless tomake it
costly to workers to be caught cheating if they are never caught. Monitoring by
itself is insufficient to deter malfeasance since there must be some cost to
workers of being caught.Considering only the size of the bond and monitoring
expenditures, the firm faces an optimal law enforcement problem in which it must
choose the amount of resources to devote to catching malfeasants and the punish-
ment to inflict on those it catches. The solution to this problem is well known
(Carr-Hill and Stern, 1979; Stern, 1978) and has been aptly characterized as "hang
litterers with probability zero." That is, next to nothing should be spent on
catching law breakers since it is cheaper to deter crime by making punishments
more severe.This solution applies equally to the bonding model since it is
costly to the firm to monitor workers but costless to increase the bond. As long
as any resources are being devoted to monitoring, the same degree of deterrence
can always be attained at lower cost by increasing the bond and reducing the level
of monitoring. Thus the efficient bonding solution involves no expenditure on
monitoring. If the probability of detection is near zero when the firm does not
monitor workers, the bond required to prevent malfeasance will be verylarge.4
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not be as large as necessary if firms spend little or nothingon monitoring. The
first is that, particularly at the beginning of their worklives, workers face
capital market constraints and thus may not be able to afford large bonds. The
second is that if the bond were very large, the firm would havea strong incentive
to claim malfeasance on the part of the worker and keep the bond. Thereis also
empirical evidence that suggests one or the other of these two constraints is
commonly binding.Since the optimal expenditure on monitoring iszero, if we
observe any expenditure on monitoring by firms, the efficientbonding solution
must not be obtainable, and it must be the case that the optimal bond exceeds the
maximum imposed by either capital markets or incentives for firm malfeasance.
Cursory inspection of almost any workplace indicates that firms do expend sub-
stantial resources monitoring workers.Firms hire supervisors, auditors, in-
spectors and testers. The pace of many jobs is monitored by machines. Evidently
firms must choose second-best methods of avoiding worker malfeasance --intensive
monitoring and/or efficiency wages. Which technique firms choose will depend on
the monitoring technology.
II.A FORMAL MODEL
Weuse a one period model. At the beginning of the period workersmay post
a bond, b. During the period workers may or may not supply effort,e, which takes
on the value 1 if effort is supplied and 0 otherwise. The probability, p(m), that
any shirking which occurs is detected by the firm depends on the firm's expendi-
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shirking, they forfeit the bond and do not receive the wage, w. However, they
are immediately employed elsewhere at the reservation wage, r.If they are not
caught shirking, they receive the wage and the bond is returned.
It should be obvious that the only possible equilibria are those in which
e equals 1.If workers provided zero effort, no output would be produced. The
firm would find it profitable to hire workers only if the expected wage net of
foregone bonds were nonpositive. However, with a nonpositive wage, workers will
be unwilling to supply labor.
Therefore, the firm's objective is to maximize profits, it,whichare given
by
(1) ¶= R(L)-(w+m)L
where L is the number of workers employed by the firm and R is revenue net of
nonlabor costs (R'>O, R''<O). Profits are maximized subject to two constraints.
The first is that the wage exceeds the reservation wage:
(2) w￿r.
The second is that workers must not have an incentive to shirk.
In specifying the conditions under which a worker will shirk, we assume that
workers are risk neutral. The model could easily be adjusted to allow for risk
aversion. We also assume, as noted above that workers who are fired for shirking
canearnthe reservation wage for the remainder of the period. This is the
equivalent of the standard competitive assumption that workers who are fired im-
mediately obtain employment at the competitive wage rate. Workers will not shirk
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plus bond if they do shirk by at least the value of shirking. Thus we have
(3) w +b￿ v +(l-p(m))(w+b)+p(m)r
where v is the benefit from shirking. There is no benefit to combinations of w
and b which exceed their minimum level so we treat (3) as an equality. Rearranging
terms gives
(4) w+bv/p(m)+r.
The firm chooses L, w, m and b to maximize (1) subject to inequality
constraint (2) and the equality constraint (4). In such problems, the constraint
that the choice variables be nonnegative can usually be ignored and an interior
solution assumed.In this case, however, the requirement that m be nonnegative
may be a binding constraint. We therefore include this constraint explicitly.
The first order conditions are given by
(5) a(.)/aL =- m-w=U
(6)
(7) a(.)/am=- L+Avp'/p2+4, = U
(8) 8(.)/Ob =X=U
where 4' is the Kuhn-Tucker multiplier associated with the constraint that inbe
nonnegative, X is the Lagrange multiplier associated with (4) and p is the
Kuhn-Tucker multiplier associated with (2).
The solution to (5) -(8)is
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(10) R' =w=r
(11) b =v/p(0).
Thus the efficient solution involves bonding with no monitoring. Efficiency is
achieved in competitive markets because the number of workers hired is chosen so
as to set the marginal revenue product equal to the wage.
As noted in the last section, firms do spend resources on monitoring workers;
so there must be limits on the extent to which bonding can be used. A formal model
of the processes which limit the size of bonds is beyond the scope of this note.5
For the purposes at hand it suffices to assume that b cannot exceed some maximum
value, b*. In this case, the firm maximizes profits subject to inequality (2),
equality (4), and b =b*.Setting b =b*and reexamining (5) -(7),it is evident
that there are three possible solutions corresponding to the cases where (6) holds
with equality, (7) holds with equality and both (6) and (7) hold with equality.
Thus the firm may choose to use only increased monitoring, only an efficiency wage
or both. In the case where both are used, the level of monitoring is chosen to
set vpt/pZ equal to one. In sum the relevance of efficiency wages is an empirical
not a theoretical question.
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The critical weakness in the argument that efficiency wages are an inefficient
solution to the problem of preventing worker malfeasance and are therefore tin-
likely to be used in practice is that the size of bonds that workers can post is
limited.The fact that firms expend significant resources monitoring workers
indicates that bonds are limited in practice.
One obvious factor restricting the size of the bonds workers can post is
wealth and credit market constraints.Another potential problem is incentive
compatibility problems on the firm's side. Lazear (1979, 1981) recognizes that
if a worker's wage exceeds his VMP, the firm will have an incentive to fire the
worker. Lazear relies on reputation costs to prevent the firm from responding
to this incentive. However, reputation costs may not be very large. The most a
firm can sacrifice if it loses its reputation is the present value of future
profits and any transaction costs involved in selling off its capital stock. In
a competitive market, the present value of expected future profits will be near
zero, and thus in a competitive market reputation costs should not exceed the
transactions costs for transferring an enterprise to new owners or hiring new
management.
Moreover, if economic actors have rational expectations, past actions are
only signals of future behavior if firms differ in some relevant way which is
unobservable so that defaulting conveys some new information.In models which
assume that all firms are ex ante identical or that workers have perfect infor-
mation about firm characteristics, if reputation costs are possible at all, they
rest on the etherial assumption that reputations matter because they matter.6
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prevent malfeasance but instead devote resources to monitoring workers. Since
resources are devoted to monitoring workers, depending on the monitoring tech-
nology, it may pay firms to reduce monitoring costs by paying efficiency wages.
Efficiency wages are not necessarily inefficient.
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1. Eaton and White (1983) analyze the trade-off between efficiencywage payments
and increased monitoring effort when no bonding arrangements are possible.
2. We refer here to private efficiency relative to the use of alternative mech-
anisms for controlling worker malfeasance rather than to the Pareto optimality
of the market outcome.The market equilibrium is generally not efficient since
firms fail to adequately take into account the impacts of theirwage and moni-
toring levels on the policies other firms must utilize to prevent shirking by
employees (Shapiro and Stiglitz; 1984, 1985).
3. It should be noted that the bonding critique does not apply to norm based ef-
ficiency wage models (Solow, 1979; Akerlof, 1984), to adverse selection based
models in which firms never learn a worker's true ability (Weiss, 1980), or nu-
trition models (Stiglitz, 1974).
4. The possibility of mistakes (Type II errors) may be another factor limiting
the size of the bond a firm can demand. If firms sometimes fire workers who were
not cheating, a very high bond may no longer be optimal since the firm would have
to compensate workers for the possibility that they would lose their bond due to
an error. The larger the bond the larger the necessary compensation. This is
only a problem if the monitoring technology doesn't allow the firm to know with
complete certainty that a worker was cheating in at least some cases. If the firm
can know some cases with certainty, the best thing to do, if workers are at all
risk averse, is to fire only those it knows with certainty have shirked and to
set the bond as high as needed to avoid shirking given the probability of de-
tection with certainty. If workers are risk neutral, then the best solution will
be perfect bonding with workers being compensated for the possibility of a mistake
with a wage premium exactly equal to their expected loss.If workers are risk
averse and some mistakes are inevitable, the firm may find it optimal to expend
resources on monitoring to reduce the required bond and compensating wage dif-
ferential. When mistakes are unavoidable, some of the attractive features of the
efficiency wage model may still obtain even if there are no queues for jobs.
Industry wage differentials can be explained as compensation for the accidental
loss of a bond. In any case, our basic argument, that if we observe expenditures
on monitoring, then perfect bonding is not attainable holds. One further caveat
is that firms may monitor workers for other reasons than perventing worker
malfeasance. Monitoring may be utilzed to avoid honest worker errors or to help
in sorting heterogeneous workers. Still, we do believe that one does observe
monitoring activities that plainly serve to help deter shirking, carelesness and
stealing by workers.
5. Eaton and White (1982) show how capital market imperfections can limit the use
of bonding and give rise to efficiency wage payments.They assume exogenous
shirking detection possibilities.
Footnotes 126. The likelihood of firm default can be reduced if the firm does notexpect to
gain anything from a default. For example, if a firm claims that a worker has
shirked and fires the worker it is possible to pay the bond to a thirdparty in-
stead of the firm. Then the worker is disciplined but the firmgains nothing if
it cheats. While this is a theoretical possibility we do not observe theuse of
this device.One arrangement which seems at first to resemble this is having
payments made to a pension fund (at least up to the point where the pension is
vested). However, if the firm defaults it does benefit. Either it can reduce
its future payments to the fund or the fund willpay higher benefits so that the
firm can pay a lower wage and still attract workers.
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